简介
田国强,1982年获华中理工大学数学硕士,1987年获美国明尼苏达大学经济学博士,博士论文获全美斯隆博士论文奖,同年被美国德州A&M大学经济系聘为助教授。1995年被提升为终身教职正教授。现为美国德州A&M大学文学院勒威斯讲座教授、民营企业研究中心高级研究员,同时也是华中理工大学和北京大学等大学的兼职教授。曾任中国留美经济学会会长(1991-1992),中国旅美社会科学教授协会首届主席(1995-1997)。研究方向有当代经济理论、激厉经济机制的设计、数理经济学、对策论、动态最优化理论、国际贸易、计量经济学和中国经济。在这些领域中
目录
acknowledgments .
前言
part i nash implementation of lindahl and walrasian allocations
1 implementation of the lindahl correspondence by a single-valued, feasible, and continuous mechanism, review of economic studies, 56: 613- 621, 1989
2 completely feasible and continuous implementation of the lindahl correspondence with a message. space of minimal
dimension, journal of economic theory, 51: 443-452, 1990 12
3 implementation of lindahl allocations with nontotal-nontransitive preferences, journal of public economics,46:247 - 259, 1991 22
4 implementation of the walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences, social choice and welfare, 9:117 - 130, 1992 35
5 implementing lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism,journal of mathematical economics, 22: 169 - 179,1993 49
6 nash-implementation of the lindahl correspondence with decreasing returns to scale technologies(with qi li and s. nakamura), international economic review,36:37 - 52, 1995 60
7. on nash-implementation in the presence of withholding (with qi li), games and economic behavior,9:222-233, 1995 76
part ii implementable state and mixed ownership systems
8. implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations,journal of economic theory, 64:568 - 584, 1994 91
9. an implementable state-ownership system with general variable returns(with qi li), journal of economic theory,64: 286-297, 1994 108
10. ratio-lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system(with qi li),journal of economic behavior and organization,26: 391-411, 1995 120
part iii bayesian implementation ..
11. continuous and feasible implementation of rational-expectations lindahl allocations, games and economic behavior,16: 135- 151, 1996 143
12. bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets, social choice and welfare, 16: 99-119, 1999 160
13. virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types, journal of mathematical economics, 28: 313 - 339, 1997 181
part iv existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
.14. on the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms,economics letters, 53: 17- 24, 1996 211
15. a characterization of the existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms(with liqun liu), review of economic design,
4:205-218, 1999 219
part v double implementation in nash and strong nash equilibria
16. double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer, economic theory, 13: 689-707, 1999
17. double implementation of lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism, social choice and welfare,
17: 125-141, 2000 254
18. implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in nash and strong nash equilibria 271
19. incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships 295
20. double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations 323
part vi informational and efficiency of mechanisms
21. on informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria, journal of mathematical economics,
23:323 - 337, 1994 343
22. on uniqueness of informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in production economies 358
23. a unique informationally efficient allocation mechanism in economies with public goods 383 ...
前言
part i nash implementation of lindahl and walrasian allocations
1 implementation of the lindahl correspondence by a single-valued, feasible, and continuous mechanism, review of economic studies, 56: 613- 621, 1989
2 completely feasible and continuous implementation of the lindahl correspondence with a message. space of minimal
dimension, journal of economic theory, 51: 443-452, 1990 12
3 implementation of lindahl allocations with nontotal-nontransitive preferences, journal of public economics,46:247 - 259, 1991 22
4 implementation of the walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences, social choice and welfare, 9:117 - 130, 1992 35
5 implementing lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism,journal of mathematical economics, 22: 169 - 179,1993 49
6 nash-implementation of the lindahl correspondence with decreasing returns to scale technologies(with qi li and s. nakamura), international economic review,36:37 - 52, 1995 60
7. on nash-implementation in the presence of withholding (with qi li), games and economic behavior,9:222-233, 1995 76
part ii implementable state and mixed ownership systems
8. implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations,journal of economic theory, 64:568 - 584, 1994 91
9. an implementable state-ownership system with general variable returns(with qi li), journal of economic theory,64: 286-297, 1994 108
10. ratio-lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system(with qi li),journal of economic behavior and organization,26: 391-411, 1995 120
part iii bayesian implementation ..
11. continuous and feasible implementation of rational-expectations lindahl allocations, games and economic behavior,16: 135- 151, 1996 143
12. bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets, social choice and welfare, 16: 99-119, 1999 160
13. virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types, journal of mathematical economics, 28: 313 - 339, 1997 181
part iv existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
.14. on the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms,economics letters, 53: 17- 24, 1996 211
15. a characterization of the existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms(with liqun liu), review of economic design,
4:205-218, 1999 219
part v double implementation in nash and strong nash equilibria
16. double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer, economic theory, 13: 689-707, 1999
17. double implementation of lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism, social choice and welfare,
17: 125-141, 2000 254
18. implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in nash and strong nash equilibria 271
19. incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships 295
20. double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations 323
part vi informational and efficiency of mechanisms
21. on informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria, journal of mathematical economics,
23:323 - 337, 1994 343
22. on uniqueness of informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in production economies 358
23. a unique informationally efficient allocation mechanism in economies with public goods 383 ...
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