激励、信息与经济机制

acknowledgments .

前言

part i nash implementation of lindahl and walrasian allocations

1 implementation of the lindahl correspondence by a single-valued, feasible, and continuous mechanism, review of economic studies, 56: 613- 621, 1989

2 completely feasible and continuous implementation of the lindahl correspondence with a message. space of minimal

dimension, journal of economic theory, 51: 443-452, 1990 12

3 implementation of lindahl allocations with nontotal-nontransitive preferences, journal of public economics,46:247 - 259, 1991 22

4 implementation of the walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences, social choice and welfare, 9:117 - 130, 1992 35

5 implementing lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism,journal of mathematical economics, 22: 169 - 179,1993 49

6 nash-implementation of the lindahl correspondence with decreasing returns to scale technologies(with qi li and s. nakamura), international economic review,36:37 - 52, 1995 60

7. on nash-implementation in the presence of withholding (with qi li), games and economic behavior,9:222-233, 1995 76

part ii implementable state and mixed ownership systems

8. implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations,journal of economic theory, 64:568 - 584, 1994 91

9. an implementable state-ownership system with general variable returns(with qi li), journal of economic theory,64: 286-297, 1994 108

10. ratio-lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system(with qi li),journal of economic behavior and organization,26: 391-411, 1995 120

part iii bayesian implementation ..

11. continuous and feasible implementation of rational-expectations lindahl allocations, games and economic behavior,16: 135- 151, 1996 143

12. bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets, social choice and welfare, 16: 99-119, 1999 160

13. virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types, journal of mathematical economics, 28: 313 - 339, 1997 181

part iv existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms

.14. on the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms,economics letters, 53: 17- 24, 1996 211

15. a characterization of the existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms(with liqun liu), review of economic design,

4:205-218, 1999 219

part v double implementation in nash and strong nash equilibria

16. double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer, economic theory, 13: 689-707, 1999

17. double implementation of lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism, social choice and welfare,

17: 125-141, 2000 254

18. implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in nash and strong nash equilibria 271

19. incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships 295

20. double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations 323

part vi informational and efficiency of mechanisms

21. on informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria, journal of mathematical economics,

23:323 - 337, 1994 343

22. on uniqueness of informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in production economies 358

23. a unique informationally efficient allocation mechanism in economies with public goods 383 ...