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简介
在全球大多数国家，公司股权是高度集中的。因此，控股股东和中小股东的关系是非常重要的代理问题。掏空（tunneling，也称隧道效应）是控股股东剥削小股东最重要的方式。尽管掏空在新兴市场国家和一些发达国家很盛行，但直接以掏空为对象的研究相对较少。大股东有时使用私人资金来支持陷入困境的公司（propping，也称支持效应）。尽管有大量坊间证据，对支持的研究缺乏直接和大样本的检验。郭飞编著的这本《关联交易和公司业绩（中国上市公司的掏空和支持证据）》基于2001—2007年间8455家中国上市公司的混合截面数据，不但研究了控股股东如何利用关联交易来掏空和支持，还对掏空和支持的绩效和价值后果进行了分析。研究发现，控股股东的存在和较高的控制权导致更多的掏空；相反，其他大股东的存在降低了掏空的程度。另外，本研究还发现在塔式控制和国有控股公司里，掏空水平相对较高。然而，当公司有较好的投资机会时，控股股东倾向于降低掏空水平。 本研究还发现控股股东给陷入财务困境且有退市风险的上市公司提供资金支持。这是首次发现有关支持的直接和大样本证据，尽管并不是所有经营不善的公司都得到了支持。掏空对上市公司的业绩和公司价值带来了负面影响，但来自控股股东的支持却对公司价值有积极影响（尽管没有改善公司的业绩）。掏空的程度远远大于支持，掏空和支持不是对称的。 由于来自新的控股股东的支持主要是要达到借壳上市的目的，因此，当他们的控制权稳固时，新的控股股东倾向于再次掏空。一言以蔽之，当法律不能很好地保护中小股东的利益时，控制人的掏空不可避免。因此，政策制定者和监管层要想消除大范围的剥削，必须建立良好运作的公司治理并严格执法。2005— 2007年间相对较低水平的掏空证实了严格监管和股权分置改革的积极效果。除此之外，监管部门还需在股权结构多元化、集团上市以及公共治理等方面有所作为。
目录
CHAPTER ONE Introduction
1.1 Overview and Objectives
1.2 Research Questions
1.3 Significance of the Study
1.4 Organisation of the Study
CHAPTER TWO Theory Review
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Dispersed Ownership and Agency Conflict
2.3 Concentrated Ownership and Theories for Ownership Discrepancy
2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Concentrated Ownership
2.5 Private Benefits of Control
2.5.1 What Are Private Benefits of Control?
2.5.2 Defence of Private Benefits of Control
2.6 Group Affiliation and Internal Markets
2.7 Summary
CHAPTER THREE Institutional Background
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Reform of SOEs and Share Issue Privatisation
3.3 State Ownership and Agency Conflict
3.4 Equity Division (Share Split Structure)
3.5 Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
3.6 Listing Quota and RPTs
3.7 Summary
CHAPTER FOUR Literature Review
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Definitions of Tunnelling and Propping
4.3 Consequences of Tunnelling and Propping
4.3.1 Consequences of Tunnelling
4.3.2 Consequences of Propping
4.4 Studies on Tunnelling
4.5 Summary
CHAPTER FIVE Hypotheses Development
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Tunnelling Hypotheses
5.3 Propping Hypothesis
5.4 Value Effects of Tunnelling and Propping
5.5 Summary
CHAPTER SIX Research Design and Methodology
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Sample Selection
6.3 Variable Definition
6.3.1 Definition of RPTs
6.3.2 Definitions of Control Rights, Controlling Shareholder, Ownership Type and Pyramid
6.3.3 Definition of Other Blockholders
6.3.4 Definition of Investment Opportunity
6.3.5 Definition of Firms in Financial Distress
6.3.6 Definition of Firm Performance
6.3.7 Measurement of Control Variables
6.4 Empirical Models
6.5 Summary
CHAPTER SEVEN Results and Discussion
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Descriptive Statistics
7.3 Test of Regression Assumptions
7.4 Regression Results and Discussion
7.4.1 Evidence of Tunnelling and Propping
7.4.2 Effect of Tunnelling and Propping on Operating Performance
7.4.3 Effect of Tunnelling and Propping on Firm Valuation
7.5 Robustness Test
7.5.1 Control Rights Threshold
7.5.2 Relationship between Tunnelling, Propping and ST
7.5.3 Endogeneity of Ownership, Tunnelling and Propping Variables
7.6 Limitations
7.7 Summary
CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Policy Implications
8.1 Conclusions
8.2 Implications of Findings
8.3 Avenues for Future Research
References
Appendix 1 A Typical State Owned Pyramidal Structure in China
Appendix 2 A Typical Private Controlled Pyramidal Structure in China
1.1 Overview and Objectives
1.2 Research Questions
1.3 Significance of the Study
1.4 Organisation of the Study
CHAPTER TWO Theory Review
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Dispersed Ownership and Agency Conflict
2.3 Concentrated Ownership and Theories for Ownership Discrepancy
2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Concentrated Ownership
2.5 Private Benefits of Control
2.5.1 What Are Private Benefits of Control?
2.5.2 Defence of Private Benefits of Control
2.6 Group Affiliation and Internal Markets
2.7 Summary
CHAPTER THREE Institutional Background
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Reform of SOEs and Share Issue Privatisation
3.3 State Ownership and Agency Conflict
3.4 Equity Division (Share Split Structure)
3.5 Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
3.6 Listing Quota and RPTs
3.7 Summary
CHAPTER FOUR Literature Review
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Definitions of Tunnelling and Propping
4.3 Consequences of Tunnelling and Propping
4.3.1 Consequences of Tunnelling
4.3.2 Consequences of Propping
4.4 Studies on Tunnelling
4.5 Summary
CHAPTER FIVE Hypotheses Development
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Tunnelling Hypotheses
5.3 Propping Hypothesis
5.4 Value Effects of Tunnelling and Propping
5.5 Summary
CHAPTER SIX Research Design and Methodology
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Sample Selection
6.3 Variable Definition
6.3.1 Definition of RPTs
6.3.2 Definitions of Control Rights, Controlling Shareholder, Ownership Type and Pyramid
6.3.3 Definition of Other Blockholders
6.3.4 Definition of Investment Opportunity
6.3.5 Definition of Firms in Financial Distress
6.3.6 Definition of Firm Performance
6.3.7 Measurement of Control Variables
6.4 Empirical Models
6.5 Summary
CHAPTER SEVEN Results and Discussion
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Descriptive Statistics
7.3 Test of Regression Assumptions
7.4 Regression Results and Discussion
7.4.1 Evidence of Tunnelling and Propping
7.4.2 Effect of Tunnelling and Propping on Operating Performance
7.4.3 Effect of Tunnelling and Propping on Firm Valuation
7.5 Robustness Test
7.5.1 Control Rights Threshold
7.5.2 Relationship between Tunnelling, Propping and ST
7.5.3 Endogeneity of Ownership, Tunnelling and Propping Variables
7.6 Limitations
7.7 Summary
CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Policy Implications
8.1 Conclusions
8.2 Implications of Findings
8.3 Avenues for Future Research
References
Appendix 1 A Typical State Owned Pyramidal Structure in China
Appendix 2 A Typical Private Controlled Pyramidal Structure in China
关联交易和公司业绩：中国上市公司的掏空和支持证据
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